Of all the sociomedical questions of our time, none is more frequently and hotly debated than abortion. Until now the debate has mostly been about the morality of abortion and whether the grounds for medical termination are too lax or too restrictive, either in theory or in practice. A lawyer who intervenes to ask "but what do you mean by 'abortion' ?" might be dismissed by all sides as quibbling or side tracking. Yet abortion in the legal sense remains a serious crime, one of several in this area. And the trouble with crimes-especially those as ancient as abortion-is that their definitions and profiles do not automatically adjust to changing social or scientific developments. Doctors are quite familiar with the Abortion Act 1967; but that really tells us of only one circumstance in which the crime of abortion is not committed. Many doctors fail to see that Act in its setting, section 58, Offences against the Person Act 1861, and beside its ever-encroaching neighbour, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
Several recent happenings, affecting doctors, hospitals, and health authorities, suggest that it would be helpful to take a good look at the condition of the law at the two extremes of gestation, where the scope of the crime of abortion begins and ends; and to look at the actual words of the law, which as often as not is paraphrased.
The unknowable embryo
In 1861 Parliament, restating legislation dating from 1801, made it a crime for anyone to do virtually anything "with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child." It called the crime "abortion" but that word does not appear in the definition, only in the margin to s58. The section continues in full effect, save only where the Abortion Act applies. So on the face of it, all so-called contraceptive techniques that work after the moment of fertilisation, or are believed so to work, are illegal.' This would include interceptive methods (such as IUDs and some types of pill) and displanting methods ("morning-after" pills, prostaglandins, endometrial aspiration). (2) altogether, and the amendment of the Abortion Act to forbid abortion after the 24th week. These proposals have not been enacted; but for the reasons given it is suggested that they wouid do no more than publicise the law as it already is.
A further implication of the words "capable of being born alive" is that it is immaterial that the child is not in fact born alive. In a recent broadcast Professor Peter Huntingford stated that in performing these late terminations there were techniques to ensure that the fetus was not born alive, and implied that experienced doctors always employed these. This seems to concede that the doctors know they may be dealing with a fetus capable of being born alive and that they act wilfully to cause it to die before birth; which, in a non-proviso case, is a confession of child destruction. Professor Huntingford was merely commenting on the various recent cases, discussed below, in which aborted fetuses were said to have been born alive and allowed to die, and was explaining that this could and should be avoided. But, while feticide may be thought preferable to homicide, the law regards both as serious crimes.
The born fetus
If a fetus is actually born alive and dies thereafter, it is selfevident that, whatever its prematurity, it must have been "capable of being born alive." This effectively disposes of one of the main defences to child destruction. But that crime will none the less be inapplicable for another reason: it applies to the death of a child only "before it has an existence independent of its mother." (This state ends once the living child is separate from the mother's body, whether or not the cord is still connecting them.) If the operator meant the child to die while still a fetus, whereas in fact it survived to die when fully born, there are two crimes to consider: attempted child destruction, child destruction being intended; and actual homicide, because the death of a human being was achieved.
The idea of attempted child destruction may seem odd when the child has in fact been destroyed, but the law of the complete offence is strict as to the stage at which the destruction must have occurred. It would not, however, be a circumvention but rather a fulfilment of the law to charge with attempted child destruction in such circumstances, for here the attempt is the completed crime plus. The alternative of homicide (murder or manslaughter) may seem even odder, in view of the intent to dispose of a mere fetus; but there is a long line of authority for it. Thus in R v West (1848),'2 where a woman who tried to abort herself induced premature delivery of a child which died, Mr Justice Maule directed the jury that ". . . if a person intending to procure abortion does an act which causes a child to be born so much earlier than the natural time that it is born in a state much less capable of living and afterwards dies as a consequence of its exposure to the external world, the person is guilty of murder." Similarly in R v Senior (1832)" a clumsy midwife who compressed the child's skull in the course of delivery, whence it died after birth, was held guilty of manslaughter by an appeal court of 13 judges. Though old, these cases are accepted as authoritative in all standard modern works on criminal law.
It follows that a doctor who has turned a safe uterine fetus into a hopelessly premature human being can only escape liability for homicide if he does everything in his power to support its life. And even so, the question of attempted child destruction remains.
Lest the views here expressed be thought of as those of a remote academic lawyer, the largely medical Lane Committee confirm and add to them: " [It] is unlawful for termination of pregnancy to be carried out by a method which destroys a fetus capable of being born alive, even if its chances of survival are slight or non-existent, unless this is done in order to preserve the life of the mother.... If a live and apparently viable fetus emerges from the termination, there is a statutory duty to try and keep it alive, however unwanted or abnormal it may be, and for the mother and child to be cared for by a midwife for 10 days. Further, if after delivery a fetus shows signs of life, an offence is committed if its birth and death are not registered or if it is incinerated elsewhere than in a crematorium.'')4 THE WANSTEAD, WHISTON, AND BARNSLEY CASES It is surprising how in recent happenings and utterances doctors, hospital and health authorities seem to be in ignorance of the law.
In the Wanstead Hospital case'5 it was alleged that an aborted fetus cried out, to the distress of patients in the gynaecological ward where the termination was performed, and where it was subsequently allowed to die. An investigation produced a public statement from the Redbridge and Waltham Forest AHA. This included the following, which it is instructive to compare with the version of the law offered in the present article. Consider in particular the passages for which italics have been supplied.
" In the Whiston Hospital case'6 it was alleged that on 4 January 1979 a 22-week fetus was aborted and remained alive for two hours, during which time, according to the report, no attempt was made to keep it alive. The local MP, Mr Gordon Oakes, said that he would call for an investigation from the new Health Minister. In the Barnsley Hospital case'-it was alleged that a 23-week fetus was aborted when it was discovered that the mother had had German measles. The child, a girl, lived for 36 hours, during which she was named and baptised by the parents. There is some dispute whether the child was properly looked after. The hospital justified the abortion on grounds of possible abnormality. But no one seems to have observed that these are not within the proviso and that there must therefore have been at least attempted child destruction if the staff foresaw the possibility of live birth. The coroner found'8 that the death resulted from prematurity and that there was no wilful failure by the medical staff. The child destruction aspect went unnoticed.
Conclusion
The present state of affairs is highly unsatisfactory. We have let sleeping dogs lie, but now the law has awoken and is barking at everyone in sight. No one is sure what the law is. So we have a Gilbertian paradox: the authorities are zealous to protect microscopic, even non-existent, embryos; yet they seem to countenance the destruction of near-human beings and the nonpreservation of actual human beings. The problem is doubly Gilbertian because on one view of the law, the late terminations are clearly illegal whereas postcoital contraception is not. The law needs urgent reform to take account of the modern facts of life. Doctors need to play a much more prominent part in reform, informing themselves what the present law says and then pressing for the improvements they see as necessary. And, since reform will not come overnight, we need meanwhile to secure the intelligent and humane enforcement of the present law, leaving unhampered what can reasonably be described as family planning; yet preventing, save in real emergencies, what can reasonably be described as quasi-homicide.
Postscript
On 13 July Mr John CQrrie, Conservative MP for North Ayrshire and Bute, introduced his Abortion (Amendment) Bill, which would amend the 1929 and 1967 Acts to make 20 weeks the upper limit for termination except to preserve the mother's life or (a new provision) where the child would be severely handicapped. Although the Bill was given a second reading by 242 votes to 98 it is not likely to get through unamended; in particular a compromise of 24 weeks seems probable. There is no proposal to amend the words "capable of being born alive" leaving still, even with the new limit, the possibility of overlap with child-destruction.
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The fine weather, with a hint of mist at dawn, lent a special feeling to walking along the edge of the marsh, with snipe roding and geese calling, but the real romance came with a beautiful moonlit evening and a Beethoven quartet-the Amadeus playing at the Maltings, and a redshank piping over the brilliant mudflats, surrounded by shimmering reeds. How well has the Maltings been rebuilt after the tragic fire, its simplicity matching that of its setting, and the deceptive ease of the string playing.
Our particular style of caravan life lived up to its usual inspiration, partly by the choice of sites, one a peaceful orchard with resident jays, the other buried in the pines, but also by the impulsive cooking, topped this time by a tasty kedgeree and draught Adnams, fetched from the Eel in the Boot in two thermos flasks. Even the journey home had its events-the first swallow, a Galaxy at Mildenhall (the largest air transporter, not chocolate) and some keenly anticipated fish and chips.
The contrasts could have been severe. In fact they were less contrasting than complementary, matching each other and giving a great deal of pleasure, crowned by moonlight and music.-j S RODGERS (community physician, Headington, Oxford).
El Greco and muscular dystrophy? "And so it was argued that El Greco's astigmatism forced him to elongate only when he was drawing imaginary figures-without a 'sitter' to portray."' There is a popular supposition in art theory that physical or mental abnormality may be not only a spur to an artist but perhaps causal to his art. Suffering and altered perception induced by physical deformity, mental precocity, instability, or an over-rich imagination impels the individual to extremes of physiological adjustment favourable to the creative act. This is not to deny the talent of the artist, who must be at home in his medium and its form of expression, but an artist's style is his own and springs from his own flawed or obliquely set identity or soul. There are many examples which are often advanced to support this theory: Byron's clubbed foot, Beethoven's deafness, Keats's tuberculosis, Dostoievsky's epilepsy ... so the argument runs. The opposite view is taken by those who instance Bach 
